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BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAIMS IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS-
DISPUTE AS TO SCOPE OF COVERAGE IN AMBIGUOUS
INSURANCE POLICIES: UNITED AIRLINES, INC. V.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALYSON MOSES*
TN THE WAKE of the devastating terrorist attacks of Septem-
.ber 11, 2001, the unprecedented damage and destruction left
behind wreaked havoc on the insurance industry. Among the
many complicated insurance issues that arose after the attacks,
courts faced mounting litigation regarding insurance policies
containing business interruption coverage.' Battles arose be-
tween insurer and insured as to the interpretation of arguably
ambiguous contract language and the extent to which such poli-
cies covered damages caused by the attacks. The case of United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvanid exempli-
fies the types of egregious mistakes courts have made in re-
sponse to the complex issues and arguments arising in these
business interruption coverage disputes. United Air Lines
(United) sued its insurance provider, the Insurance Company of
the State of Pennsylvania (ISOP), for loss of revenue stemming
from interruptions to the airline's business following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks.' The Second Circuit refused to consider am-
biguities in the language of the insurance policy that reasonably
could have led to an alternate interpretation of the terms in the
policy and erroneously held that United could not recover dam-
ages for its business interruption claims.4
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2008; B.A., Washington
University in St. Louis, 2005. I would like to thank my parents, Buddy and
Rochelle Moses, for their continued love, support, and encouragement.
I See Andrew B. Downs & Sean K. Hungerford, Business Interruption Coverage: A
Primer on the Physical Loss Requirements, NEV. LAw., June 2004, at 12.
2 439 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 Id. at 128.
4 Id. at 129.
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Shortly after the hijacked planes crashed into the World
Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania
on September 11, 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) ordered a nation-wide shutdown of the entire aviation
system, which included a notice to close all operations at all air-
ports nationwide.5 Though the "ground stop" order was lifted
on September 14, 2001, Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport remained closed until October 4, 2001.6 Although
United's facilities at Reagan Airport suffered no significant phys-
ical damage as a result of the nearby attack on the Pentagon,
United claimed a loss of gross earnings that totaled approxi-
mately $4.7 million for the two-week period that the airport re-
mained closed.7 According to United, its "Property Terrorism &
Sabotage" insurance policy with ISOP entitled it to recover these
losses.8
While the parties appeared to be in general agreement on the
facts of the September 11 events, they disagreed on the manner
in which the insurance policy terms and conditions applied in
the context of those events.9 Based on its interpretation of the
language in the policy, United reasoned that it was entitled to
compensation for the lost earnings at issue and provided persua-
sive arguments to support its position.' ° United argued that it
was entitled to recover these earnings under the "Civil Authority
Clause" contained in a-separate section of the policy because the
post-attack order to shut down the airport was a direct result of
physical damage to the Pentagon, which was on "adjacent
premises." I
On July 14, 2003, United brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a
declaratory judgment and recovery in breach of contract under
its "Property Terrorism & Sabotage" insurance policy with
ISOP. 12 ISOP- answered the complaint'and submitted seven
counterclaims, seeking declaratory judgment that it was not obli-
5 United Airlines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 385 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 347.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 347-48.
10 United Airlines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128, 129 (2d Cir.
2006).
11 Id. at 130.
12 Id. at 129.
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gated to cover the claims alleged by United in the complaint.'3
On June 1, 2004, United moved for summary judgment. 4 ISOP
opposed United's motion and cross-moved for summary judg-
ment on all claims.' 5 The district court denied United's motion
for summary judgment and granted ISOP's cross-motion for
summary judgment.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that ISOP was not obligated to cover United's claims
for business interruption coverage under the terms of the "Prop-
erty Terrorism & Sabotage" insurance policy (the Policy). 7
Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judg-
ment against United."8
The Second Circuit rejected United's arguments set forth as a
basis for recovery of the business interruption claims under the
Policy.'" In accordance with ISOP's interpretation of the Policy
language, the Second Circuit agreed that to recover gross earn-
ings, United needed to demonstrate that the business interrup-
tion at issue resulted from either: (1) physical damage to
property at the insured location (the airport); or (2) from an
order of civil authority issued as a direct result of physical dam-
age to property adjacent to the insured location in question (the
Pentagon).2" The court found the language of the insurance
policy to be unambiguous, and because United could not show
that its loss of gross earnings resulted from physical damage to
its property or from an order of civil authority issued in re-
sponse to damage to an adjacent property, the Second Circuit
denied recovery for the losses.21
United also sought to recover its loss of gross earnings under
the "Civil Authority Clause" in the Policy.2 2 In order to recover
under this clause, the Second Circuit determined that United
must show that it was denied access to its property at the airport
during the government's suspension of incoming and outgoing
flights "as a direct result of damage to adjacent premises. 23
13 Id.
14 United Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
15 Id.
16 United Airlines, Inc., 439 F.3d at 130.
17 Id. at 129.
18 Id. at 135.
1,I Id. at 129-30.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 129.
22 Id. at 134.
23 Id.
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Though the district court determined that the Pentagon did not
qualify as an "adjacent premise" under the Policy provision, the
Second Circuit conceded that the term "adjacent" could indeed
be ambiguous, as maintained by United.24 United argued that
two properties could be adjacent without necessarily sharing a
border,2 5 and the court agreed with this conclusion.26 The Sec-
ond Circuit acknowledged that both United's argument and the
district court's reasoning were persuasive with regard to whether
the Pentagon fit the definition of an "adjacent premises" for the
purpose of the "civil authority" provision. 27 The Second Circuit,
however, ultimately determined that it did not need to resolve
this issue, holding that even if the Pentagon was "adjacent" to
United's property, United could not show that the airport was
shut down "as a direct result of damage to" the Pentagon.28
In contrast to United's belief that the FAA shut down the air-
port under order of civil authority as a direct result of the terror-
ist attack at the Pentagon and its impact, the Second Circuit
concluded that the government's decision to halt operations at
the airport was instead based on fears of future attacks.2 9 The
Second Circuit further noted that the airport was reopened
when it was able to comply with more rigorous safety standards
and that the timing of the ground-stop order "had nothing to
do with repairing, mitigating, or responding to the damage
caused by the attack on the Pentagon."30 The court cited other
courts' interpretations of civil authority clauses after September
11, and found that, in concluding that the business interruption
was caused by fears of future attacks rather than actual physical
damage inflicted on the Pentagon, its causation analysis was con-
sistent with that of the other courts.3
There are a number of weaknesses and oversights in the Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis of United's business interruption insur-
ance coverage. For example, the court failed to address proper
standards for judicial interpretation of ambiguities in contract
24 Id.; Haber v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 1998)
("As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous
when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading.").
25 See, e.g., United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524, 538-40 (1904).




30 Id. at 135.
31 See, e.g., Chicago v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02C7023, 2004 WL 549447, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004).
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language, causing the court to rebuff alternate interpretations
supporting United's position. Nowhere in the court's analysis
did the Second Circuit address the principle that, "under New
York law, which governs this case, an ambiguous provision in an
insurance policy is construed most favorably to the insured and
most strictly against the insurer. '13 2 The insurer bears a heavy
burden of proof to establish that the words and expressions
used in the insurance policy are not only susceptible of the con-
struction sought by the insurer, but that it is the only construc-
tion which may fairly be placed on them.3
According to this accepted principle of insurance contract in-
terpretation under New York law, the Policy should have been
construed in a way most favorable to United, as the insured. In
the case at bar, ISOP failed to fulfill its burden, and yet the Sec-
ond Circuit avoided resolving the conflicting interpretations of
ambiguous contract terms rather than giving United's under-
standing of the language due, preferential consideration. The
court recognized the ambiguity of the term "adjacent" in the
Policy language but refused to resolve the question of whether
the Pentagon qualified as "adjacent" to United's property. 4
The court acknowledged the strength of United's argument that
the Pentagon was an "adjacent" premises, and upon construing
the Policy language in United's favor, should have concluded
that the Pentagon was "adjacent" to United's property as re-
quired by the Policy's "Civil Authority Clause."
With regard to the causation requirement in the Policy's
"Civil Authority Clause," the Second Circuit blatantly misstated
the Policy language. The Second Circuit reasoned that, in order
to recover under the Policy's "Civil Authority Clause," "United
must show that it was denied access to its locations at the
[a]irport as a direct result of damage to adjacent premises. 3 5
The Policy actually stated that the section "specifically extended
to cover a situation when access to the Insured Locations is pro-
hibited by order of civil authority as a direct result of damages to
adjacent premises. '' 31 A direct causal relationship between
United's lost business income and the "ground-stop" order dif-
fers entirely from a direct causal relationship between the lost
income and damage to "adjacent premises." The Second Cir-
32 See, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1981).
33 See, e.g., id. at 840.
34 United Airlines, Inc., 439 F.3d at 134.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
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cuit began its causation discussion by confusing these two dis-
tinct relationships, and the muddled analysis of the "Civil
Authority Clause" causation requirement continued thereafter.
The Second Circuit's analysis of the causation requirement in
the Policy's "Civil Authority Clause" overlooked the important
distinction between the concepts of purpose and causation.
The Second Circuit concluded that the business interruption
was caused by fears of future attacks and not by the actual physi-
cal damage on the Pentagon. 7 The proposition that the FAA's
"ground-stop" order was not issued as a result of the horrifically
destructive terrorist attack on the Pentagon (and World Trade
Center towers) is preposterous. Although it might be true that
fear of future attacks operated as a main purpose behind the
government's decision to impose the "ground-stop order," it can
hardly be said that the physical damage inflicted on the Penta-
gon was not a prime causal factor in the government's decision
to shut down the airport. Black's Law Dictionary defines proxi-
mate cause as "[a] cause that directly produces an event and
without which the event would not have occurred."38 The safety
concerns cited by the court as the cause of the business interrup-
tion would not have come about in the first place had the terror-
ist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon not
occurred. It is counterintuitive to suggest that the airport clo-
sure did not result from damage to the nearby Pentagon.
The "Civil Authority Clause" in the case at bar did not call for
a purpose requirement in lieu of, or in addition to, a causation
requirement, but even if the Second Circuit's application of a
purpose element had been warranted, the analysis employed by
the court was misguided. The Second Circuit claimed that,
"[t]he evidence ... indicate[d], not surprisingly, that the gov-
ernment's subsequent decision to halt operations at the Airport
indefinitely was based on fears of future attacks." 9 The Second
Circuit, however, endeavored to make this purpose determina-
tion without specifying the source of business interruption on
which the court based its analysis. The FAA "ground-stop" order
was lifted nationwide on September 14, 2001, but Reagan Air-
port remained closed until October 4, 2001.40 It is unclear
whether the Second Circuit's reference to the "government's
37 Id. at 135.
38 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004).
39 United Airlines, Inc., 439 F.3d at 134.




subsequent decision to halt operations at the Airport indefi-
nitely .... 4 was alluding to the FAA's nationwide "ground-
stop" order or to Reagan Airport's prolonged closure. The Sec-
ond Circuit explained, however, that the federal government re-
quired that the airport remain closed until October 4, 2001
because of the location of the airport, the fact that the airport's
flight paths take aircraft near the White House, Pentagon, and
Capitol, and because "the [airport] was reopened when it was
able to comply with more rigorous safety standards. '4 2 From
these explanations, it appears that the Second Circuit based its
conclusion (that the government's decision to halt airport oper-
ations was due to a fear of future attacks) on the airport's pro-
longed closure, rather than the FAA's initial nationwide
"ground-stop" order. Yet the Second Circuit referred to the na-
tionwide "ground-stop" order throughout its opinion, never dif-
ferentiating between the FAA order and the airport's continued
closure.
To support its contention that United could not show that the
airport was shut down as a direct result of damage to the Penta-
gon, the Second Circuit also pointed out that there was "appar-
ently a temporary halt of flights into and out of the [a] irport on
9/11 before the Pentagon was struck."43 In citing this detail, the
Second Circuit once again ignored important factual distinc-
tions with regard to the unfolding of events of September 11.
Approximately half an hour before the FAA issued its nation-
wide "ground-stop" order, the Metropolitan Washington Air-
ports Authority (MWAA) made the decision to close Reagan
Airport.44 The Second Circuit erroneously insinuated that the
MWAA's decision to close the airport before the attack on the
Pentagon verified its conclusion that the airport could not have
been shut down as a direct result of damage to the Pentagon.
The Second Circuit failed to make necessary specifications with
regard to critical background facts and carelessly misused those
facts as evidence to support its analysis of United's business in-
terruption claims (which, once again, was an analysis errone-
ously based on purpose rather than causation). In other words,
the Second Circuit employed a misguided analysis using a pur-
pose requirement (a requirement that did not even exist in the
41 United Airlines, Inc., 439 F.3d at 134 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 135.
43 Id. at 134.
44 United Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
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insurance policy), and did so under the false guise of a causa-
tion analysis.
Further, the authority cited by the Second Circuit to support
its causation argument should be distinguished from the case at
bar due to critical distinctions ignored by the court. In the case
of City of Chicago v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., which also dealt
with business interruption claims resulting from the FAA's
"ground-stop" order after the September 11 attacks, the district
court held that the FAA ultimately imposed the "ground-stop"
order to protect against any future terrorist attacks. 45 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, ignored important differences between
the language found in the insurance policy in City of Chicago and
the language in the case at bar. The "civil authority clause" in
City of Chicago specifically limited coverage to business interrup-
tions caused by temporary actions "to prevent immediately im-
pending physical loss or damage insured by this policy.""6 That
insurance policy specifically looked to purpose as a condition
upon which recovery relied. Recovery for business interruption
losses depended upon civil authority action intended for the
purpose of preventing "immediately impending physical loss or
damage.""7 The policy at hand contained no such limitation,
instead specifying that it covered business interruption losses if
caused by "damage to or destruction of the Insured Locations,
resulting from terrorism ... [and] extended to cover a situation
when access to the Insured Locations is prohibited by order of
civil authority as a direct result of damage to adjacent premises
.... ""4 Unlike the policy language in City of Chicago, the civil
authority clause in the case at bar conditions recovery for busi-
ness interruption losses on a causation requirement, as opposed
to a purpose requirement. The district court's assertion that the
"ground-stop" order was imposed to protect against future ter-
rorist attacks was made in the context of arguments based on
dissimilar insurance policy language, and thus the Second Cir-
cuit should not have relied on City of Chicago for authority in the
case at bar.
Had the Second Circuit applied proper principles of contract
interpretation-namely the rule of construing ambiguities in in-
surance policies most favorably to the insured-the court most
45 See Chicago v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 02C7023, 2004 WL 549447, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 United Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
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likely would have ruled in favor of United, granting recovery for
the business interruption claims at issue in this case. Instead,
the court employed skewed logic in its analysis of the causation
requirement in the Policy's "Civil Authority Clause," resulting in
a counterintuitive conclusion which further disfavored United's
credible claims. The Second Circuit recognized that "the pur-
pose of business interruption insurance is to indemnify the in-
sured against losses arising from an inability to continue normal
business operations and functions due to damage sustained as a
result of the hazard insured against. '49 The Policy in this case
plainly clarifies that terrorism is a "hazard insured against," and
United's losses did, in fact, arise from an inability to continue
normal business operations due to the "ground-stop" order is-
sued in response to the damaging September 11 terrorist at-
tacks. Thus, United's business interruption claims in the case fit
squarely within the definition of proper business interruption
insurance coverage, as advanced by the Second Circuit. Yet, the
Second Circuit failed to utilize proper standards for interpreting
ambiguous contracts, blatantly misstated policy language, em-
ployed a purpose requirement where none existed (rather than
appropriately employing a causation requirement analysis), mis-
used critical background facts in its misguided analysis, and
cited authority that did not actually support its flawed argument.
It is no great surprise, following blunder after blunder, that the
Second Circuit erroneously concluded that United could not re-
cover its business interruption claims.
49 United Airlines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir.
2006) (quoting 68A N.Y. JuR. 2D Ins. § 539 (2005)).
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